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“Global governance” is now ubiquitous, used and abused by academics and policymakers.  A 
Google search offers a crude measure, generating over 3.1 million hits at the end of 2012— 
astonishing given that two decades ago it was almost unknown. Despite or perhaps because 
of its omnipresence, global governance remains notoriously slippery. While it has a potential 
beyond conveying a sense of the complexity of contemporary global authority, it has become, 
among other things, an alternative moniker for international organizations, a descriptor for a 
world stage packed with ever more actors, a call to arms for a better world, an attempt to 
control the pernicious aspects of accelerating economic and social change, and a synonym for 
world government (Craig 2008).  
 
This imprecision has robbed the term of conceptual rigor, in the main forcing us to 
fall back on more staple approaches of international politics for explanatory sustenance (Ba 
and Hoffman 2005).  The best that could perhaps be said about global governance is that we 
invoke it to indicate a super-macro level of analysis; we do not use it to convey a discreet and 
pithy understanding of how the world works.  As such, we have hardly advanced in 
answering the question that Lawrence Finkelstein posed in the first volume of the journal that 
took the same name, “what is global governance?” He provocatively answered, “virtually 
anything” (Finkelstein 1995, 368). 
 
Our aim is to press for rethinking how we conceive and apply the term. On the one 
hand, “global governance” has become both widespread and useful for describing growing 
complexity in the way that the world is organized and authority exercised as well as 
shorthand for referring to a collection of institutions with planetary reach. On the other hand, 
the analytical capacity of the term has not been mined sufficiently to enable us to get a better 
handle on the underlying dynamics of change.  Our argument is that a deeper investigation of 
contemporary global governance can potentially capture accurately how power is exercised 
across the globe, how a multiplicity of actors relate to one another generally as well as on 
specific issues, make better sense of global complexity, and account for alterations in the way 
that the world is and has been organized (or governed) over time—both within and between 
historical periods.   
 
It is our contention that an investigation into global governance should concentrate on 
four primary pursuits. First, it should move beyond the strong association that has come to 
exist between the term and virtually any change in the late twentieth century. It should 
instead be understood that the complexities of the post-Cold War era are merely the most 
concrete recent expression of global governance, but that forms of world organization have 
been and will be different in other epochs. Second, it should identify and explain the structure 
of global authority accounting not just for grand patterns of command and control but also for 
how regional, national, and local systems intersect with or push against that structure.  A 
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concern with multiple levels of governance is not enough, although it is a good start (Bache 
and Flinders 2004).  Third, a central preoccupation should be to investigate the myriad ways 
that power is exercised within such a system, how interests are articulated and pursued, the 
kind of ideas and discourses from which power and interests draw substance as well as which 
help establish, maintain, and perpetuate the system.  Fourth, it should account for changes in 
and of the system and focus on the causes, consequences, and drivers of change, not just 
today but over extended periods of time.   
 
Our aim is not to advance a theory of global governance but to highlight where core 
questions encourage us to go.  We pick up on earlier work that has fallen by the wayside and 
seek to re-energize the search for a better understanding of “global governance as it has been, 
is, and may become” (Hewson and Sinclair 1999, ix).  If our propositions are correct, and if 
better answers to the questions that global governance encourages us to ask are forthcoming, 
a more rigorous conception should help us understand the nature of the contemporary 
phenomenon as well as look “backwards” and “forwards.”   Such an investigation should 
provide historical insights and prescriptive elements to understand the kind of world order 
that we ought to be seeking and encourage us to investigate how that global governance can 
come about.  The value-added of the concept results from opening our eyes to how the world 
was, is, and ought to be organized—certainly better than simply “muddling through” as we 
seek to counter the threats that confront the planet (Lindblom 1959). 
 
We begin with an overview of the intellectual genesis of the term, concentrating on 
why global governance emerged, what it was intended to depict, and how its meaning has 
evolved over the last two decades.  Here we show how its emergence was bound up with a 
specific set of changes in authority and the exercise of power that became visible at the end 
of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century.  While the term arose to describe 
change in the late twentieth century, its association with that specific moment has frozen it in 
time and deprived it of a greater capacity to understand change.  Put another way, “global 
governance” has come to mean world governance without world government and not a more 
generic analytical tool for understanding how the globe is organized.  We then explore what 
global governance has helped us explain, but also what it has missed.  Imprecision has 
resulted in a feebler conceptual tool than it should for understanding how the world is 
organized and how power is exercised. We then spell out the four desirable components of an 
investigation.  The penultimate section considers how, despite its emergence from—and 
indeed its relationship with—a specific and quite recent historical moment, global 
governance has considerable traction in looking back to explain the nature and complexities 
of, as well as wholesale changes in, previous global orders and in looking forward toward 
how the contemporary world ought to be organized.   
 
The Emergence of Global Governance 
 
Mainstream thinking has shifted decidedly away from the study of intergovernmental 
organization and law toward global governance. The term itself was born from a 
marriage between academic theory and practical policy in the 1990s and became 
entwined with that other meta-phenomenon of the last two decades, globalization. 
James Rosenau and Ernst Czempiel’s (1992) theoretical Governance without 
Government was published just about the same time that the Swedish government 
launched the policy-oriented Commission on Global Governance under the 
chairmanship of Sonny Ramphal and Ingmar Carlsson (1995).  Both set in motion 
interest in global governance. The publication of the commission’s report, Our Global 
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Neighbourhood, coincided with the first issue of the Academic Council on the United 
Nations System (ACUNS) journal Global Governance.  This newly-minted quarterly 
sought to return to the global problem-solving origins of the leading journal in the 
field, which seemed to have lost its way.  “From the late 1960s, the idea of 
international organization fell into disuse,” Timothy Sinclair reminds us. 
“International Organization, the journal which carried this name founded in the 
1940s, increasingly drew back from matters of international policy and instead 
became a vehicle for the development of rigorous academic theorizing” (2012, 16). 
 
These developments paved the way for a raft of works about growing global 
complexity, the management of globalization, and the challenges confronting 
international institutions (Prakash and Hart 1999).  In part, global governance 
replaced an immediate predecessor as a normative endeavor, “world order studies,” 
which was seen as overly top-down and static. Having grown from World Peace 
through World Law (Clark and Sohn 1958), world order failed to capture the variety 
of actors, networks, and relationships that characterized contemporary international 
relations (Falk and Mendlovitz 1966-7). When the perspectives from world-order 
scholars started to look a little old-fashioned, the stage was set for a new analytical 
cottage industry. After his archival labors to write a two-volume history of world 
federalism, Joseph Barrata aptly observes that in the 1990s “the new expression, 
‘global governance,’ emerged as an acceptable term in debate on international 
organization for the desired and practical goal of progressive efforts, in place of 
‘world government.’” He continues, scholars “wished to avoid using a term that 
would harken back to the thinking about world government in the 1940s, which was 
largely based on fear of atomic bombs and too often had no practical proposals for the 
transition short of a revolutionary act of the united peoples of the world” (2004, vol. 
2, 534-535). Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall said it more adroitly: “The idea of 
global governance has attained near-celebrity status. In little more than a decade the 
concept has gone from the ranks of the unknown to one of the central orienting 
themes in the practice and study of international affairs” (2005, 1). 
 
Yet, the emergence of the term—and changes in the way that aspirations for 
insights from it were expressed—did not empty global governance of the normative 
content stemming from preoccupations that motivated previous generations of 
international relations and international organization scholars.  In this way, global 
governance came to refer to collective efforts to identify, understand, or address 
worldwide problems and processes that went beyond the capacities of individual 
states. It reflected a capacity of the international system at any moment in time to 
provide government-like services in the absence of world government. Global 
governance encompassed a wide variety of cooperative problem-solving arrangements 
that were visible but informal (e.g., practices or guidelines) or were temporary 
formations (e.g., coalitions of the willing). Such arrangements could also be more 
formal, taking the shape of hard rules (laws and treaties) or else institutions with 
administrative structures and established practices to manage collective affairs by a 
variety of actors—including state authorities, intergovernmental organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, private sector entities, and other civil society actors 
(Weiss and Thakur 2010). 
 
It is also worth noting that the need to refresh thinking about how to better 
utilize international organizations underpinned the efforts of scholars working under 
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the auspices of the “Multilateralism and the United Nations System” (MUNS), a 
project coordinated by Robert W. Cox and sponsored by the United Nations 
University (UNU) (Sakamoto 1992; Krause and Knight 1995; Cox 1997; Schechter 
1999a and 1999b).  The stated intention was to capture, revitalize, and build upon the 
legitimacy connoted by the term “multilateralism” as a way of thinking about how to 
better organize the world.  As Cox summarized:  
 
“Global governance” means the procedures and practices which exist at the world 
(or regional) level for the management of political, economic and social affairs.  
One hypothetical form of governance (world government or world empire) can be 
conceived as having a hierarchical form of coordination, whether centralized 
(unitary) or decentralized (federal).  The other form of coordination would be 
non-hierarchical, and this we would call multilateral (Cox 1997b, xvi).  
 
An earlier and widely-cited project directed by John Ruggie (1993) had also 
aimed to substantiate the idea that “multilateralism matters,” albeit less ambitious in 
the way that it sought to conceptualize the capacity of this institutional form to be 
refashioned.  Another UNU project actually challenged his more traditional concept 
of multilateralism (Newman, Thakur and Tirman 2006).  Yet, the insights of all of 
these projects were unable to rehabilitate the study of global authority via a reclaimed 
multilateralism. Global governance proved more pervasive and persuasive. 
 
Global governance also became bound up with another normative project 
ignited by worries about the shortfalls in the capacity of states to reign in the activities 
of a range of actors and to blunt the sharper consequences of global marketization as 
well as the seemingly unstoppable actions of powerful international economic 
institutions.  In this variation—what Nayan Chanda (2008) called “runaway 
globalization”—the political authority of some great powers and international 
economic organizations along with the absence of authority among others (largely 
those states that encountered globalization as a quasi-force of nature) underpinned 
growing dissatisfaction in civil society (Hall 1998; Hobsbawn 1998). This 
disgruntlement found expression in mass demonstrations during the meetings of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, 
European Union (EU), and various regional development banks as well as in the 
growth of an anti- and then an alter-globalization movement (Peet 2003; Amoore 
2005). The normative result was one of governing globalization (Väyrynen 1999; 
Coyle 2000; Held and McGrew 2002).   
 
In short, potential analytical traction evaporated because global governance 
meant so many different things to so many different people.  It embodied the hopes 
and fears of many at the turn of the millennium but failed to satisfy the need to 
analyze those tumultuous times. 
 
It is worth recalling briefly what those dramatic changes were as well as what 
the term hoped to describe and capture.  Three broad developments underpinned the 
appearance of the notion of global governance: the character of global problems, the 
nature of actors, and the perceived limitations of international measures to govern the 
planet. 
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Beginning in the 1970s, interdependence and rapid technological advances 
fostered the growing recognition that many problems defied the problem-solving 
capacities of a single state. Prior to this time, and the evidence of world wars and the 
Great Depression notwithstanding, most observers would have argued that powerful 
states could usually solve problems on their own, or at least could insulate themselves 
from the worst impacts. Efforts to eradicate malaria within a geographic area and to 
prevent those with the disease from entering a territory should be seen as qualitatively 
different from halting terrorist money-laundering, avian flu, or acid rain. Today no 
state, no matter how powerful, can labor under the illusion that it can protect its 
population from such threats. Rich states earlier could insulate themselves by erecting 
effective barriers, whereas a growing number of contemporary challenges to world 
order simply cannot be prevented by erecting walls. And politicians can no longer 
completely shy away from recognizing that reality—except perhaps during elections. 
 
  The development of a consciousness about the global environment and the 
consequences of human interactions, and especially the 1972 UN conference in 
Stockholm, is usually seen as a game-changer in the evolution of thinking. Although 
other examples abound, sustainability is especially apt to illustrate why we are all in 
the same listing boat. It simply is impossible that such laudable localized actions as 
environmental legislation in California or wind farms in Denmark can put the brakes 
on the destructive trajectory for climate change down which the planet is hurtling 
(Newell 2012). 
 
 The second development underpinning growing interest in global governance 
was the sheer expansion in numbers and importance of non-state actors (NSAs), 
particularly civil society and for-profit corporations, and more especially those with 
trans-national reach (Willetts 2011).  While analysts of international relations and 
international organization had become aware and included them into their thinking 
and concepts, they were still seen as appendages to the state system (Keohane and 
Nye 1971). Such growth has been facilitated by the so-called third wave of 
democratization (Huntington 1991), including institutional networks similar enough 
to facilitate greater trans-national and trans-governmental interactions described by 
Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) and David Grewal (2008), a growing disillusionment 
with state capacity and state willingness to deal with social issues, and the onset of a 
more pernicious global economic environment.   
 
A third driving force lay in concerns to upgrade the UN system for the post-
Cold War period.  Combining worries about the increasingly trans-border nature of 
problems and state incapacity to address them with a desire to draw from the untapped 
potential of “new” global actors, scholars and practitioners sought to shore-up the 
world body by encouraging it not only to reform but also to partner with others to 
address pressing issues.  One aspect of this movement pressed the United Nations to 
recognize the comparative advantage of other actors that were better able to fulfill key 
tasks, including roping NGOs and TNCs more closely into the work of the world 
organization through the Global Compact.  Another explored the capacity for a 
“complex multilateralism” to emerge designed to capture the capacity of global social 
movements to fill a legitimacy gap in global governance (O’Brien et al 2000, 3).  
Another still sought to address the “crisis of multilateralism” through root and branch 
reform of UN institutions (Newman 2007).   
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Whatever the exact explanatory weight of the three driving forces, the 
emergence and widespread recognition of trans-national issues that circumscribed 
state capacity along with the proliferation of NSAs responding to perceived shortfalls 
in national capabilities and a willingness to address them in the context of a perceived 
crisis of multilateralism combined to stimulate new thinking.  Scholars of 
international relations and international organization began to ask questions about the 
precise role of other actors that were to varying degrees already global agents.  
Multinational corporations and philanthropic institutions, for instance, were obscured 
from the sight of analysts who focused on states as the only or at least the most 
consequential actors.  As a consensus about the pace and extent of global change 
grew, so did the impulse to understand the significance of an even greater range of 
players, extending later to faith actors and financial rating agencies as well as such 
less salubrious agents as transnational criminal networks and terrorist movements 
(Sinclair 2005; Madsen 2009; Marshall 2013).  At the same time, scholars began to 
ask what kind of governance was exerted by mechanisms such as markets that had 
previously been the sole purview of international political economists (Cox 1997a).  
So, whereas states and the intergovernmental organizations that they had created had 
once monopolized the attention of students of international organization, the closing 
decades of the twentieth century encouraged the shift from state-centric structures to a 
wide range of actors and mechanisms. 
 
These ideas, in turn, were carried over into real-world developments.  New, or 
newly recognized, as well as old actors combined in partnerships, thereby blurring 
even further the traditional conception of a world shaped essentially by the 
interactions of states and their relative power capabilities. The United Nations “sub-
contracted” security operations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
the Balkans and to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
West Africa as well as to development and humanitarian NGOs for the delivery of 
services, assistance, and protection (Gordenker and Weiss 1996; Weiss 1998).  And as 
indicated above, the UN itself also formed a coalition with multinational corporations, 
labor unions, and civil society around shared concerns for social and environmental 
standards in the Global Compact (Hughes and Wilkinson 2001; Ruggie 2001). 
 
These new institutional forms and partnerships encouraged investigators to ask 
questions not only about who and what were involved in the organization of the world 
but also how any particular form of organization came about and its mechanisms of 
control.  Here, work accelerated on networks and epistemic communities, super-sized 
business gatherings like the World Economic Forum and counter weights such as the 
World Social Forum, and markets and investor decision-making (Haas 1992; Cox 
1992; Germain 1997; Stone and Maxwell 2005; Sinclair 2005; Pigman 2007). To 
borrow an image from the late James Rosenau, a “crazy quilt” of authority was 
emerging and shifting, resulting in a “patchwork” of institutional elements that varied 
by sector and over time (1999, 293).  He also correctly attached the adjective 
“turbulent” to our world and times and struggled to make sense of “fragmegration,” or 
the simultaneous pulls toward fragmentation and integration (1990).  
 
Plus ça change… 
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Yet, for all of the interest that growing complexity engendered, and the new and novel 
scholarly first-cut in thinking about global governance, old ways persisted.  Three-
quarters of a century of distinguishing the study of international relations from 
political science as one characterized by a focus on states as the primary units of 
analysis continued to condition thinking and weighed heavily on the way that scholars 
understood this altered world.  Similarly, students of international organization have 
continued to emphasize the role of major powers in intergovernmental organizations 
as the central lens through which to view human progress.  
 
However, older ways also involved thinking outside of these boxes. The late 
Harold Jacobson observed that the march by states toward a world government was 
woven into the tapestries decorating the walls of the Palais des Nations in Geneva—
now the UN’s European Office but once the headquarters of the defunct League of 
Nations. They “picture the process of humanity combining into ever larger and more 
stable units for the purpose of governance—first the family, then the tribe, then the 
city-state, and then the nation—a process which presumably would eventually 
culminate in the entire world being combined in one political unit” (Jacobson 1984, 
84). Other than a few surviving world federalists, virtually no one believes that is 
where we are headed; and Mark Mazower (2012), for one, is comfortable with the 
disappearance of this noble but megalomaniacal, visionary but delusional idea.  
 
Thus, our best shot was to label this complex world where authority was 
exercised differently “global governance,” but to persist with familiar state-centric 
ways of understanding it, to view all other actors and activities as appendages to the 
international system that analysts have observed since the Peace of Westphalia. What 
the ups and downs of global change had injected was curiosity and new questions.  
They revolved around how the world was organized and authority and power 
exercised therein, and the knowledge that we lacked by merely peering at states for 
insights.  But we stopped short of providing real answers to questions that pushed us 
beyond comfort levels with older modes of thinking.   
 
 “IO plus” was basically Larry Finkelstein’s original answer to “what is global 
governance?” His reply is not all that different from contemporary responses.  Indeed, 
the journal that was established to drive forward understandings of new worldwide 
complexities—Global Governance—signaled a reluctance to break with old ways of 
thinking in its subtitle, A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations. 
 
 According to Craig Murphy’s masterful history of “global governance” avant 
le mot since the nineteenth century, international organizations customarily are 
viewed as “what world government we actually have” (2000, 789). He is right, but the 
problem lies elsewhere. At the national level we have the authoritative structures of 
government that are supplemented by governance. However, internationally we 
simply have governance with some architectural drawings for modest renovations in 
international structures that are several decades old and not up to present building 
codes. Blue-prints sit in filing cabinets while unstable ground and foundations shift 
under feeble existing structures, which are occupied by a host of other actors, 
processes, and mechanisms that all-too-often occupy only our peripheral vision. The 
result has been that the value of global governance in understanding complexity and 
especially the drivers of change has been less than fully exploited. We have updated 
the Finklestein’s answer: “add new actors and issues and stir.” 
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We also have too closely associated the changes that we sought to explain 
with a particular moment in time, the post-Cold War era.  The capacity of existing 
international organizations to address pressing contemporary challenges is called into 
question by their demonstrated inability to bind key states in meaningful ways to 
address global problems—to which efforts to protect the global environment, 
eradicate world poverty, or attenuate increasing inequalities within and across states 
and social groups bear ample witness. Consequently, the association of global 
governance with the hopes, worries, and complexities of a particular moment runs the 
risk of turning it into an historical artefact.  This consignment brings with it a risk of 
losing sight of questions about how the world is organized and authority exercised. In 
short, we need to rescue the term.  
 
Reviving Global Governance 
 
These risks should push us to probe more deeply into how the world truly is 
organized—or as John Ruggie some time ago asked, how “does the world hang 
together?” (1998, 2) What is it that we need to do in order to realize the analytical 
utility of global governance?  The first part of an answer is to tackle global 
complexity in a more satisfactory fashion, not to be afraid to disaggregate by issue 
and by context, and then to try and fit the data back together into an explanatory 
whole.  We should not only describe who the actors are and how they connect to one 
another, but also how a particular outcome has resulted and why and on what grounds 
authority is effectively or poorly exercised. We should examine the consequences of 
new forms of organization and determine what adjustments might be made to enhance 
their utility to meet existing, new, or changing social goals. Important as well are 
subtler understandings and a better appreciation of the differing characteristics of 
institutions and the effects when those with varying natures and capabilities come 
together. 
 
Another essential task is giving greater thought to the way that power is 
exercised other than indicating that Germany is not Gabon, that emerging powers are 
on the rise, and that the end of Pax Americana is nigh (Strange 1987; Layne 2011).  In 
today’s international system, state capabilities matter as do the way that formal and 
informal institutions meditate relations between states and the way that goods and 
services are exchanged and managed. When the numbers and kinds of actors 
proliferate, markets are less controlled by states, and more complex relations exist 
between actors and markets, questions of power are less straightforward.  Here we 
should probe more than the relationship between the birth of the current phase of 
international institutions and US power, illustrated by the work of John Ruggie (1994) 
and John Ikenberry (1992).  We should also reflect on institutional expressions and 
social groups, epistemic communities and policy networks, financial decision-making 
and changing capabilities among other actors (Haas 1992; Pogge 2001; Cerny 2010; 
Helleiner and Pogliare 2011; Stone 2012). 
 
Finally, and despite some notable endeavors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Gill 2002; Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009), we have yet to fully understand the ideas 
and interests that drive the organizations that we have, and more particularly how they 
arise and develop, and subsequently permeate and modify the international system.  
Here ideas themselves are important as are the value systems upon which they sit, the 
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discourses in which they are embedded, and the interests to which they speak. So too 
are the individuals who generate those ideas, the networks through which they are 
disseminated, the ways that various institutions mediate core messages, and the 
processes through which ideas are translated into forms of organization and policy 
delivery. Jeffrey Checkel (1997) long ago called for “mid-level theory,” and we as a 
scholarly community have yet to do that and link ideas to global governance. 
 
Without a concerted effort to press forward our understanding of the 
complexities of global governance, the way that authority and power are exercised, 
and the ideational and material aspects of global organization, we risk not only 
misunderstanding the world around us but also underestimating our capacity to make 
meaningful adjustments to that order. In short, we can no longer ignore global 
governance’s capacity to understand change—past and future as well as present. 
 
Global Governance: Backwards and Forwards 
 
Thinking harder about global governance may have utility beyond understanding 
where we are and the nature of the world order in which we live, or which actors we 
should or should not emphasize or ignore when thinking about complexity (Jentleson 
2012).  The questions asked in the closing decades of the twentieth century may also 
be useful in helping us understand where we have come from and where we are going.  
And the analytical utility of global governance as a conceptual device beyond the 
current order may lie in ideas advanced about a refashioned multilateralism 
immediately after the Cold War’s end. 
 
Earlier we recalled Robert Cox’s distinction between global governance as 
multilateralism and as world government or empire.  This distinction provides a 
potentially fruitful way of thinking about global governance that removes some of the 
blinkers that its association with the post-Cold War moment entails. We understand 
global governance as the sum of the informal and formal ideas, values, norms, 
procedures, and institutions that help all actors—states, IGOs, civil society, and 
TNCs—identify, understand, and address trans-boundary problems. If so, we ought to 
do so not merely on the basis of its contemporary manifestations, which emerged 
from a specific and recent historical moment, which responded to a perceived need to 
better understand what was going on, and which sought to capture global change as a 
positive phenomenon.  Pursuing answers to the question “how is the world governed” 
across time should also give us a better idea of where we have come from, why 
change has happened, and where we are going.   
 
Put differently, if we apply the same kinds of questions that led to 
understanding global governance as a pluralization of world politics at the end of the 
last century, then we should also be able to determine what kinds of systems of world 
order existed before the current one, and how power and authority were exercised.  In 
brief, we should have answers about the ultimate drivers of change and their impact. 
  
A willingness to ask how the world was governed as well as how that 
governance has changed over time has the potential to destabilize international 
relations theory. It opens our analytical aspirations to examine a complexity that, in 
fact, has always existed; and it requires us to account for that complexity by adjusting 
our theoretical lenses to examine that long-standing complexity.  As many have 
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shown, the global governance of the Westphalian era was more than an anarchic state 
system alone.  For instance, Hendrik Spruyt (1994) reminds us that a mosaic of 
actors—states and non-states—have always been involved in global governance 
although some states have been far more capable actors than other states and NSAs.   
 
Indeed, perhaps the best that we can say about the community of international 
relations scholars over the past half-century is that we have manufactured a handle to 
grasp how the inter-state part of the global governance complex has worked. 
However, we have spent too little time thinking about what other agents and forms of 
governance exist and have existed, and what the relationships between them and the 
inter-state system have been—not just in the last few decades, but forever.   
 
 One way to think about global governance over time is to evaluate the kinds of 
ideas about world order that have prevailed.  In the two dimensional and static view of 
the Westphalian order as an inter-state system, an assertion that the organizing 
principle is anarchy tells us nothing about why the world has been organized that way 
or why we need to know about what existed before hand.  Such an approach takes us 
into well-charted territory, but our way of journeying through it—if we focus on 
questions of how and why the world is organized—is different and potentially more 
satisfactory. 
 
One reason for the emergence of the inter-state system as the broad framework 
that governs the world was a response to ideas that—in the European world at least—
sought to move away from a form of global governance in which papal authority was 
supreme to one in which various secular rulers exercised sovereignty over discrete 
geographic units.  While ideas of self-determination found their first expression here, 
the move from papacy to state was not necessarily in the interests of the populations 
who were subjected to this new form of governance.  Nor did it end the influence of 
the papacy, or of religious institutions more generally, in the global governance of the 
time.  Nor did it extinguish ideas about the subjugation of populations beyond 
national borders as a “legitimate” product of global governance—though the fight 
against later expressions of European imperialism most certainly accelerated the 
consolidation of self-determination as a foundational principle of the subsequent 
system of global governance.   
 
Other agents that contributed to how the world was governed until this point—
such as mercenary armies and city states to name but two—fell into relative 
desuetude, but new actors emerged to play a more central role.  Indeed, we can 
observe how Eric Hobsbawn’s (1994) “Age of Empire” came about as the dominant 
form of world organization from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries by 
scrutinizing the role of private enterprises—which in many cases started off as 
“privateer” ventures and became the nationally sanctioned “companies” of European 
empires—in extending imperialism as the dominant form of global governance.  
 
Asking questions about the rush to empire enables us to see the role of such 
actors as the British and the Dutch East India Company, but it also helps to 
distinguish between the kind of global governance in existence during the 
appropriation of European imperial power (as well as the brutal forms of governance 
to which colonized peoples were subjected) and that which existed once the scramble 
for colonies subsided.  The usual route into thinking about how the world was 
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organized in the nineteenth century is to examine how the balance of power became 
institutionalized among the major European countries through the Holy Alliance and 
the Concert of Europe (Morgenthau 1995, 481-489). Yet this perspective tells us 
merely of efforts to avoid costly and catastrophic wars in Europe, not how the world 
was governed. Absent from this view are the competing imperialisms that were the 
dominant frame of global governance along with differing ideas about the subjugation 
of non-European peoples and the colonization of uninhabited lands (or that were 
treated as terra nullius irrespective of indigenous populations).  Moreover, this 
dominant form of organization and the ideas on which it was based were subject to 
challenges—both ideational and physical—that eroded the bases of competing 
imperialisms and helped set in motion the wholesale changes in global governance 
that we now label “post-colonialism.” 
 
Craig Murphy’s (1994) International Organization and Industrial Change: 
Global Governance since 1850 traces the origins of global governance to the middle 
of the nineteenth century. His examination of public unions as the forerunners of 
“global governance” is anomalous in that the term arose, as we have seen, early in the 
1990s. However, his effort suggests the crucial importance of testing the framework 
of global governance as an approach to understanding how the world was organized 
in other historical periods than our own. The utility of Murphy’s work lies in his 
willingness to connect changes in the form and function of global governance with the 
onset, consolidation, and acceleration of another global dynamic that mainstream 
international relations has always found it difficult to comprehend—the industrial 
revolution and the logic of global capitalism. Others too have used this form of 
economic and social organization as a different starting point for thinking about how 
the world is organized and governed (Chase-Dunn and Sokolovsky 1983).  These 
works contribute considerably to our understanding of what world authority structures 
we actually have, but they do not—attempts to historicize these approaches further 
notwithstanding (Frank and Gills 2003)—fully explore the kinds of questions an 
enquiry into the historical manifestations of global governance demands.  Likewise, 
John M. Hobson’s (2004) work on the contribution of non-Western civilizations to the 
contemporary world and non-European forms of organization offers useful insights 
into—but not a complete platform for—thinking about global governance, past and 
present. 
  
It is also worth bearing in mind that, if the questions that led us to define 
contemporary global governance pluralistically were driven by the need to understand 
change and new horizons, we should be able to ask similar questions about earlier 
epochs and find satisfactory answers. John Boli and George M. Thomas’s (1997) 
research on international nongovernmental organizations goes in this direction. 
Peering into the past through the lenses of global governance makes one realize that, 
like globalization which once seemed novel but is not, global governance also is not 
new.   
 
The call of many an historian to learn lessons for the future from the past 
resonates loudly (Macmillan 2009).  E. H. Carr (1961, 62) commented that history is 
an “unending dialogue between the past and the present.”  The relevance of this 
caveat was immediately obvious to three authors of a recent international relations 
text who argue, “One of the often-perceived problems of the social sciences is their 
lack of historical depth” (Williams, Hadfield, and Rofe  2012, 3). Nothing is more 
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valued in contemporary social science than parsimony, which puts a premium on the 
simplest of theoretical pictures and causal mechanisms. History complicates matters, 
which is one of the reasons that global governance has become widespread as an 
approach because it “emerges out of a frustration with parsimony and a determination 
to embrace a wider set of causes” (Sinclair 2012, 69). Self-doubt and reflection flow 
naturally from historical familiarity in a way that they do not from abstract theories 
and supposedly sophisticated social science. 
 
Yet, wrenching global governance from a contemporary moment and applying 
it historically is not enough. This move would have limited value if it also were not a 
valuable approach to understanding tomorrow. The future-oriented value lies in 
treating global governance as a set of questions that enable us to work out how the 
world is, was, and could be governed, how changes in grand and not-so-grand patterns 
of governance occurred, are occurring, and ought to occur.  This is an urgent 
intellectual task to which scholars should turn. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is commonplace to state that many of the most intractable contemporary problems 
are trans-national, ranging from climate change, migration, and pandemics to 
terrorism, financial instability, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and 
that addressing them successfully requires actions that are not unilateral, bilateral, or 
even multilateral but rather global. Everything is globalized—that is, everything 
except politics. The policy authority and resources necessary for tackling such 
problems remain vested in individual states rather than collectively in universal 
institutions. The classic collective action problem is how to organize common 
solutions to common problems and spread costs fairly. The fundamental disconnect 
between the nature of a growing number of global problems and the current 
inadequate structures for international problem-solving and decision-making goes a 
long way toward explaining the fitful, tactical, and short-term local responses to 
challenges that require sustained, strategic, and longer-run global perspectives and 
action. 
 
Can a more comprehensive framework of global governance help us to attack 
that basic disjuncture? Contemporary global governance is a half-way house between 
the international anarchy underlying Realist analysis and a world state. The current 
generation of intergovernmental organizations undoubtedly helps lessen transaction 
costs and overcome some structural obstacles to international cooperation as would be 
clear to anyone examining international responses to the 2004 tsunami or on-going 
humanitarian crises for which we see a constellation of helping hands—soldiers from 
a variety of countries, UN organizations, large and small NGOs, and even Wal-Mart.  
 
Global governance certainly is not the continuation of traditional power 
politics. It also is not the expression of an evolutionary process necessarily leading to 
the formation of structures able to address contemporary or future global threats. Nor 
is it simply bound up with governing the economy in the longue durée. Moreover, to 
speak of “governance” and not “government” is to discuss the product and not the 
producer. Agency and accountability are absent. In the domestic context governance 
adds to government, implying shared purpose and goal orientation in addition to 
formal authority and police or enforcement powers. For the globe, governance is 
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essentially the whole story, what Scott Barrett (2007, 19) describes aptly as 
“organized volunteerism.”   
 
To these observers, voluntary action has its limits; and so, taking conceptual 
steps toward a more complete framework of global governance is required. Our 
journey should be toward a better understanding of how the world was and currently 
is organized or disorganized, including how its complexity is unpacked, how authority 
and power are exercised, what are the ideational and material drivers of change, and 
who benefits. That knowledge should also place us in a position to propose what 
should and could happen to improve the planet’s prospects.  
 
At the end of the day, we require more satisfactory answers to “What is global 
governance?” Otherwise, we are left with images from two authors who rarely appear 
in the pages of the scholarly journals focused on how the world is organized: Gertrude 
Stein’s characterization of Oakland, “there’s no there, there,” or Lewis Carroll’s 
Cheshire cat, a grinning head floating without a body or substance. 
 
 In comparison with international organization, peering through the lens of global 
governance opens the analyst’s eyes to viewing a host of actors and informal 
processes of norm and policy formulation as well as change and action. The crucial 
challenge in the near term is to push the study of global governance beyond the notion 
of “add actors and processes into the international organization mix and stir.”  
 
Global problems require global solutions. We have to identify cooperation at 
various levels and with specific actors so that we can determine how global public 
goods may result from a host of means and forms, formal and informal, including 
supranational authority. There, we have again uttered a notion that typically qualifies 
authors for an asylum (Weiss 2009). We can point to numerous examples of helpful 
steps in issue-specific global governance—for instance, of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross for the laws of war and humanitarian principles, of the 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (or FIFA, its familiar abbreviation) 
for the world’s most popular sport (football or soccer), and of the International 
Association for Assigned Names and Numbers (also better known by its acronym, 
ICANN) for the internet.   
 
Yet we have to do more than hope for the best from norm entrepreneurs, 
activists crossing borders, profit-seeking corporations, and trans-national social 
networks. To state the obvious, they can make important contributions but not 
eliminate poverty, fix global warming, or halt mass atrocities. In accepting the limits 
of global governance without global government, our core argument is that today 
numerous gaps (Weiss and Thakur 2010; Weiss 2013) should and could be better 
plugged in a variety of ways in order to better address key problems confronted by 
international society. At the same time, these essential measures should be taken 
without losing sight of the horizon. Vision is essential because history is not 
prophecy. 
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